We present a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine both entry and financial development. The elite will seek a lower level of effective minority protection than the middle class to prevent potential entrants from raising financing. The elite wins because its lobby can promise larger political contributions due to the higher rents earned by restricting entry. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribution becomes less unequal, and the political system becomes more accountable. Evidence across 48 countries indicates that greater accountability and lower income inequality are associated with stronger legal enforcement, even after controlling for legal origin and per-capita income. Moreover, greater political accountability increases entry in external capitaldependent industries; its inclusion makes financial development insignificant. These results suggest that lobbying protects established interests by creating entry barriers and undermining legal enforcement.
Introduction
Cross-country evidence suggests that countries with weak protection of minority interests tend to have poorly developed capital markets and less external finance. Financial development is important as it appears to support economic growth.
1 A general scarcity of external finance appears to be particularly damaging for smaller firms and the process of new firm creation (e.g. Cabral and Mata, 2003) .
Legal origin (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; 1998) explains part of the cross country variation in financial market development. The time series evidence suggest that the extent and relative ranking of financial development across countries changes over time, presumably reflecting changes in the legal environment in response to political shifts (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003) .
This paper models explicitly a political process of legislation and enforcement and its impact on entry. It is related to the recent literature on political economy of finance, which emphasize the importance of power and wealth distribution on institutional choices. The approach takes as exogenous income distribution and democratic access, and admits that their historical determinants may arise from either legal origin (LLSV, 1997) or the endowment theory of institutional structure (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997) , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) ). Its focus is seek to describe institutional changes over time.
Most political economy models rely on a democratic voting process and partisan (i.e. ideologically committed) politicians. 2 We take here the view that once elected, politicians act opportunistically, so their choices may be influenced by active lobbying. Then lobbying may allow smaller groups to exert a disproportionate political influence on legislation or its enforcement, as first noted by Olson (1965) . Helpman (1994) and (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) are classical examples of lobbying models. We contribute to this approach by endogenizing lobby formation and their agendas.
In the model we propose, the composition and agenda are endogenous to the conflict between established interests and emerging classes. We focus on lobbying on legislation affecting the ease of entry for new entrepreneurs. Poor effective protection of investors which limits external financing can undermine entry, and thus favor incumbents and established interests. In our interpretation of the analysis we focus on legal enforcement affecting the availability of external finance, but the model may apply to any policy (antitrust, regulations and licensing, entry procedures, judicial efficiency, education, etc.) which are critical for entry and market access. 3 At the 1 For a survey, see Levine, forthcoming. 2 Examples are Berglof and Bolton (2003) and Gradstein (2003) , who study how income inequality reduce growth by affecting the protection of property rights and thus the incentive to invest. Biais and Mariotti (2003) study how tough bankruptcy laws which favor entry are resisted by richer entrepreneurs as they increase wages. 3 The model can also be applied to lobbying over enforcement, since whatever the formal content end, we provide empirical evidence that inequality and political accountability indeed undermine entry directly, and not just through their impact on financial development. In fact, we show that once we control for inequality and democratic accountability, financial development does not affect entry.
The basic political conflict is simply described. Since wealthier citizens do not need much external finance for investment funding, their lobby will seek weaker effective minority investor protection than the median class. 4 We allow for endogenous, sequential formation of lobbies. As a result, lobby constituency and agenda is also endogenous. Our first result is that the lobby for the elite is the first to be formed, and that its agenda will be set up so as to ensure a victory over any competing lobbies.
The reason that the elite always wins over a competing lobby is not that it has more cash in advance, which would be a trivial result. (In our model, bribes are paid ex post contingent on a favorable outcome.) Rather, the reason is that their preferred policy to limit entry generates higher rents than any competing lobby, so the elite can promise a larger transfer to politicians. Competition from other lobbies affects the transfer to the legislator and ultimately contributes, once the political system becomes highly accountable to voters, to a shift to much greater effective minority protection.
The model first determines the lobby size required to win the lobbying game. As a result, the winning lobby agenda is the level of investor protection that allows all lobby members to fund their own entry. The main determinants are wealth inequality and political accountability. The result on inequality is quite intuitive. A mean-preserving increase in inequality reduces the desired level of effective minority protection for the elite, as the optimal amount of entry can now be achieved with less investor protection. Entry barriers appear to be indeed significantly higher in developing countries, where income distribution is more unequal, and in more corrupt economies with few constraints on political power (Djankov et al., 2002) .
5 They are also higher in countries with poor financial development, where they indeed appear to reduce entry (Laeven, Klapper and Rajan, 2003) .
A large body of literature suggests that the greater is wealth inequality, the stronger is the incentive by the elite to maintain political control in order to preserve its rents and thus to limit entry (most recently, Zingales, 2003b, and Acemoglu, 2003) . The elite may choose distorted institutions which limit growth, of existing laws, politicians or public officials can to some extent interfere selectively with their application. but maintain their control over major decisions. 6 In an influential paper, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) discuss evidence that the early colonies in America which were created around a sharp initial inequality (due to the nature of their resources) have grown less than more equal societies, independently of colonists' national origin. He, Morck and Yeung (2003) show that countries where the same companies maintain a dominant position over time have lower economic growth, worse protection of investor rights and less developed capital markets.
The model suggests that wealth inequality may not just persist but worsen over time, a process which may continue until the political environment becomes more accountable. The intuition is that when a highly unequal distribution of wealth produces limited entry, only those able to create firms will earn profits, thus producing an even more skewed ex post wealth distribution. Successful lobbying favored by income inequality may thus create a underdevelopment trap.
The second major results is that "accountability" of politicians, defined as sensitivity to voter preferences, has a major effect on regulatory enforcement supporting entry because it induces an expansion in the dominant lobby, which must represent a broader set of preferences and would therefore admit greater entry. 7 The intuition is that accountability increases the bribe required by the legislator to deviate from the social optimum. This in turn induces the lobby of established interests to choose better legal protection in order to reduce the required payment.
Recent evidence suggests that institutional constraints on the executive appear to affect growth directly, while reliable contractual enforcement affects growth only via their effect on financial development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003) . It appears that democratic accountability has a first order effect on economic development.
We next extend the model to a setting with multiple legislators, endogenizing their voting choice under influence of lobbies. As in the basic model, the outcome depends mainly on the distribution of wealth as well as of the degree of accountability in the legislative (or judicial) branch, proxied by the number of independent legislators. We show that in general a rich lobby will construct a "supermajority" of politicians to ensure its preferred regulatory choice, in line with formal models in political science (Groseclose and Snyder, 1996) .
The model finally predicts that as democratic accountability increase beyond a certain threshold, there is a radical transition. As the required bribe to win over legislators rise beyond some threshold, lobbying cease and legislators switch to the socially optimal amount of minority protection and thus financial development. Such an institutional reversal leads to the maximum degree of entry and growth.
In our model, greater accountability supports growth by improving conditions for entry even if the elite maintains political influence.
8 Accountability here reflects the sensitivity of politicians to public welfare, and may be due to a power structure due to initial legal origins or initial endowments.
We make no attempt to model accountability. In reality, the allocation of power and the restraints on executive power may well be a function of some initial inequality. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) suggest that power over legal enforcement was assigned in France to the state because high inequality made local lords too powerful, and to the judiciary in the UK because dispersion of income made the king potentially too powerful. In Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) , colonies created around plantation economies were inherently unequal and needed a repressive system to function.
We test the two main empirical predictions. First, we find that measures of effective enforcement, which should be critical measures for a reliable legal system, are negatively correlated with the Gini coefficient (a proxy for wealth inequality) and positively correlated with a measure of democracy (a proxy for political accountability). These correlations are statistically and economically significant and hold even after controlling for legal origin and per capita income.
Second, we analyze entry across countries and industry in the framework developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) . There appears to be more entry in industries that require more external capital in countries which are more democratic. This result holds even when we control for legal origin, accounting standards, financial and economic development. In fact, no measure of financial development is any longer a significant determinant of entry rates.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. Section 3 derives the market equilibrium conditional on the level of investor protection set initially. In Section 4, we solve the political competition game to find the initial level of investor protection. Section 5 examines a few extensions of the basic model. Section 6 contains the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes.
Setup of the model
We consider an economy inhabited by a population whose size is normalized to 1. There are two types of individuals in this economy: m < 1/2 entrepreneurs and 1−m consumers. The entrepreneurs have the human capital to set up a new firm and an endowment of capital (apples) e w < I, where e w is uniformly distributed on the support [(I − σ)/2, (I + σ)/2]. The parameter σ 6 I is a measure of wealth inequality: an increase of σ results in a mean-preserving spread on the distribution of w. Consumers have an endowment of capital e w c distributed according to a distribution function G(w) with a mean equal to w c . All individuals receive utility from consumption at t = 4 (the last period in the model).
There are two goods: apples (which is also the investment good and the numeraire) and apple pies (produced by entrepreneurs using apples as input). The utility of a representative individual i is:
where k i is the amount of apples, c i is the number of apple pies consumed at t = 4, a > 1 is a constant.
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The capital needed to finance the project can be raised in two ways. (i) Entrepreneurs can invest their own wealth in their own company. Of course, this source of funds is bounded above by their wealth e w.
(ii) They can raise funds on the capital market as external equity.
10 (We will consider a private equity market later) We denote α ik as the stake held by agent i in firm k, and α jj is the equity stake owned by the entrepreneur j in his own firm.
As an alternative investment opportunity, individuals can access a riskless technology that produces 1 + r units of apples in t = 4 for each apple invested in t = 0. We normalize the number of pies to equal the number of individuals in the economy. Competition in the public capital market ensures that the required rate of return on equity financing is r.
The sequence of events, depicted in Figure 1 , is as follows:
At t = 0, entrepreneurs may form interest groups to lobby politicians.
At t = 1, lobbying takes place on the choice of the degree of investor protection δ, and a political majority takes the decision. We postpone the description of the lobbying subgame to Section 4.
At t = 2, firms are set up. To be undertaken, each firm needs an individual entrepreneur and a fixed amount of apples, I. Firms last for one period and each produce an output of 1 apple pie. The value of each firm is p, where p is the equilibrium price of apples pies.
At t = 3, the output of apple pies is produced. Before paying dividends to shareholders, the entrepreneur can keep some of the pies for himself (expropriating the shareholders). This expropriation is limited by the degree of investor protection, which imposes a minimum fraction δ of the output to be paid as dividends.
At t = 4, the market for apple pies opens and the price p is determined. Individuals then choose their consumption bundle and consume. The budget constraint faced by a generic agent i is
where y i is the total income produced at t = 3. For the representative consumer c,
where P k α ck P k ≤ w c is total financial investment (P k is the value of company k), and d k is the total dividends (in apples) paid by firm k. For the representative entrepreneur j with his own firm, there are two extra terms:
where the third term is the capital raised on the market net of the investment in firm j, and the last term reflects his private control benefits.
We assume that the economy is closed and the maximum number of firms in this economy (m) is such that the net present value of setting up a firm equals zero. Specifically, in our setting this is equivalent to assuming (a − m) = I(1 + r).
Finally, we assume that only entrepreneurs lobby politicians. This assumption can be justified on the basis that consumers are dispersed and cannot overcome the free-riding problem. 
Market equilibrium
We establish the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model by backward induction.
At t = 4, each agent i maximizes the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2). From the first order conditions (which are necessary and sufficient), we obtain that for all i, c i = a − p ≡ c, that is, all individuals choose to consume the same amount of apple pies: a − p. The consumption of apples depends instead on the individual income:
The price of pies is obtained by the market clearing condition: with n active firms, the supply of pies is n, while the demand of pies is (a − p). Hence, Lemma 1 In equilibrium, p = a − n, and c = n. The indirect utility of a generic agent i is V i = y i + 1/2 n 2 , where y i is his income.
Notice that the income of a representative consumer c is given in (3), while the income of the representative (active) entrepreneur j is given in (4).
At t = 3, active entrepreneurs choose to what extent they appropriate profits. Consider a representative firm j. Since dividends paid out to shareholders are d j , the private benefits of control enjoyed by the insiders are (1 − d j ), plus the dividend on their stake α jj d j . Minority shareholders thus receive (1 − α jj )d j . All entrepreneurs choose to pay out the very minimum dividend, d j = δp, because the marginal benefit of each dollar of profits being diverted is 1 and the marginal cost is α jj 6 1.
Proceeding backwards, at t = 2, entrepreneurs have limited ability to raise external capital because investors rationally expect them to pay out only a fraction δ of their profits. Indeed, investors buying a fraction 1 − α jj of the firm expect to receive (1 − α jj )δ pies, valued at a price (a − n) each. The return from their investment is therefore (a − n)(1 − α jj )δ. Since they can alternatively invest their apples with a rate of return r, minority investors are willing to give the entrepreneur at most (a − n)(1 − α jj )δ/(1 + r) apples. Since α jj is bound between zero and one, the maximum amount of external capital that entrepreneurs can raise is (a − n)δ/(1 + r). Hence, Lemma 2 Only entrepreneurs with a wealth w > I − (a − n)δ/(1 + r) ≡ w(δ) are able to set up a firm.
Here we obtain a first useful result: w(δ) is strictly decreasing in the degree of investor protection δ. With better investor protection, entrepreneurs can raise more external capital and need less personal wealth to set up a firm. This is consistent with the theoretical models in Modigliani and Perotti (2001) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and the empirical evidence by LaPorta et al. (1997 LaPorta et al. ( , 1998 .
The cutoff value w(δ) is also a function of the number of active firms n: the higher the number of active firms, the higher the required because profits are lower. The number of active firms n is also a function of the degree of investor protection because only entrepreneurs with an endowment of capital larger or equal to w(δ) can set up a firm. Since the endowment of entrepreneurs is uniformly distributed on the support
In equilibrium we therefore have:
By solving the system of equations (5) we obtain the following result:
Lemma 3 The number of active firms is n = m δa−(I−σ)(1+r)/2 mδ+σ(1+r)
. Only entrepreneurs with an endowment of capital larger or equal to w(n) = (I + σ)/2 − nσ/m are able to set up a firm. This is an important result: the degree of investor protection δ has a direct impact on the degree of competition. Specifically, higher investor protection allows greater entry.
We can now show that higher investor protection is also reflected in higher social surplus (since consumers prefer more competition). To see this, consider the indirect utility of representative consumer c. Since the capital market is competitive and there is no asymmetry of information, the value of a generic firm k must be such that the return from investing in the firm's equity, pδ/P k , equals the return from investing in the alternative investment, 1 + r. Hence, the income of the representative consumer c (3) simplifies to y c = (1 + r)w c . His indirect utility then becomes:
Since V c is increasing in n and n is increasing in δ, then V c is increasing in δ.
On the other hand, the income of a representative (active) entrepreneur j (4) simplifies to y j = (1 + r)w j + (m − n), where the second term is the net present value of the project (we used here the normalizing assumption that m = a − I(1 + r)). Hence, his indirect utility is:
It is easy to show that V j is decreasing in investor protection as long as j is an active entrepreneur, that is, if w j > w(n). 12 This reflects the fact that the profits decrease with the number of active entrepreneurs. Otherwise, V j is increasing in δ because j is simply a consumer.
The social surplus can then be written as a function of the number of active firm
where w C and I/2 are the average consumers' and entrepreneurs' wealth respectively, 1 − m is the number of consumers in the economy, m is the number of entrepreneurs, and n is the number of active entrepreneurs. The derivative of S with respect to n equals (m − n), which is positive because n < m.
Since n is increasing in δ, we obtain that:
Lemma 4 The social surplus is strictly increasing with investor protection. The optimal level of investor protection is δ = 1.
In conclusion, the economy as a whole benefits from high investor protection. However, while consumers and (to some extent) poor entrepreneurs benefit from high shareholder protection, rich entrepreneurs prefer low investor protection.
Political Decision on Investor Protection
As a benchmark, consider first the case of a government where politicians maximize the welfare of the median voter. Since customers represent the majority of the population, the political choice will be high investor protection (δ = 1). The reason is that the median voter is a consumer who stand to lose from low investor protection. Hence, the outcome of a direct vote on investor protection is the median voter choice (notice that the median voter theorem holds in our setting).
The political outcome differs from the median voter choice, if politicians care not only about social surplus but also about contributions they receive from lobbyists. In this case, individuals will organize in lobbying conditions to push forward their economic interests. In our setting, we assume that consumers are too dispersed to organize in pressure groups, while entrepreneurs can form lobbying groups to push for a specific degree of investor protection lobbies are able to make political contributions to politicians conditional on the policymakers' vote on investor protection. Given that there is monotonic relationship between δ and the number of active firms n, it is easier to think in terms of lobbyists and politicians choosing n.
Lobbying involves complex skills. First, the lobbyist needs to own a technology to commit credibly to a political contribution schedule. In other words, he must credibly offer to the politician a contribution schedule as a function of his political decision. Second, the lobbyist needs to elicit the resources to pay the political contributions from all the members of the lobbying group. To do so he must solve the free-riding problem of participating to a lobby. Specifically, we assume that lobbyists are able to foreclose the capital markets to all entrepreneurs who could raise enough funding to start a firm, but do not belong to a lobby. (A possibility is that lobbyists with political influence can ensure that free-riding entrepreneurs be prevented from raising finance by inducing politicians to a selective enforcement of the law.) Finally, we assume that each lobbyist has an incentive to maximize the surplus captured by the group of entrepreneurs supporting his lobby. In other words, the lobbyist receives a compensation which is a function of the surplus generated.
We assume that there are two professional lobbyists in the economy. Lobbyists move sequentially, so the first one has a Stackelberg advantage of choosing the richer lobby. (It is easy to see that this strategy is optimal.)
The structure of the political subgame is as follows: 1) Nature chooses which lobbyist moves first. The first lobbyist sets up a lobbying group by choosing a target number of firms n 1 and collects from them a political contribution, contingent on a successful political choice of the associated δ. Specifically, the lobbyist commits to pay L 1 if the politician chooses δ such that n = n 1 , and 0 otherwise.
2) The second lobbyist sets up his own lobbying group by choosing n 2 . 13 He commits to pay L 2 if the politician chooses n = n 2 , and 0 otherwise.
3) Entrepreneurs choose whether to join the first or the second lobbying group, or none of them. The first lobbyist makes its offer, the second follows. No further rounds are possible. 4) Politicians choose between the two proposals so as to maximize their own 13 As a tie-breaking assumption, we assume that if the two lobbyist offer the same level of investor protection, the entrepreneurs prefer to join the first lobbyist rather than the second one.
objective function:
where L i is the political contribution of lobby i, β ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the policymakers' benevolence (inclination towards the social surplus), and S i is the social surplus associated with n i given in (8).
We suppose politicians wish to be re-elected, and that β indicates to what extent their voting record over issues is important relative to their spending in political promotion. We take β to be a measure of actual accountability. As the political system becomes more democratic politicians become more "accountable" to voters, and β increases. 5) The entrepreneurs belonging to the winning lobby split equally to costs of the political contribution L i .
It is important to stress that the legislator chooses only between the two proposals and not over all possible levels of entry. We discuss later the effect of a broader choice.
In this setting the political equilibrium is the following:
Proposition 1: The number of active entrepreneurs is
where φ ≡
The corresponding level of investor protection is:
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition of the proof is simple. The equilibrium is found by backward induction. At stage 4, the politician chooses the level of investor protection (which maps into a number of active entrepreneurs) proposed by the first lobby only if the political contribution paid by the first lobby (L 1 ) exceeds the political contribution of the second lobby (L 2 ) plus the difference in social surplus between the two levels of investor protection (∆S) weighted by the measure of accountability β. Otherwise, the politician chooses the level of investor protection desired by the second lobby.
At stage 3, the richest entrepreneurs choose to join the first lobby. More precisely, all entrepreneurs that will be active with the low level of investor protection chooses by the first lobby, that is all entrepreneurs with wealth w j > I(m−n 1 )/m, will join the first lobby. The poorest entrepreneurs do not join any lobby because they would not be able to set up their firm even with the higher level of investor protection proposed by the second lobby. These are the entrepreneurs with wealth w j < I(m − n 2 )/m. The remaining entrepreneurs will join the second lobby.
At stage 2, the second lobbyist chooses the desired level of investor protection to maximize the chances of winning. For this purpose he pays as political contribution the entire surplus enjoyed by the entrepreneurs who join the second lobby. The latter is given by the product of the size of the second lobby (n 2 −n 1 ) and the profit enjoyed by each entrepreneur in the second lobby (m − n 2 ). Hence, L 2 = (n 2 − n 1 )(m − n 2 ). To maximize the chances of winning, the second lobbyist chooses n 2 to maximize the costs for the first lobbyist to win: (n 2 − n 1 )(m − n 2 ) and is willing to pay the entire surplus as a political contribution:
It is interesting to notice that the second lobbyist acts as a Stackelberg's follower, as his action n 2 maximizes the residual surplus after the choice n 1 of the first lobbyist.
At stage 1, the first lobbyist acts as the Stackelberg's leader anticipating that he can win by paying a political contribution L 1 = L 2 + β∆S/(1 − β). The first lobbyist then maximizes the surplus that he can generate, n 1 (m − n 1 ), net of the political contribution, L 1 .
Proposition 1 state that the first lobby always wins and defines its optimal size n 1 and the corresponding level of investor protection. Lobbying competition never leads to the success of the middle class lobby, as the first lobbyist can always adjust its competition by co-opting more intermediate-wealth entrepreneurs. Thus, changes in parameters only affect the size (and thus the legislative preference) of the rich lobby, not whether the rich lobby will win or lose.
The results in Proposition 1 yield a few empirical predictions.
The size of the rich lobby n * (entry), and the level of minority protection δ * both increase with φ. It is easy to see that φ is strictly increasing in our measure of accountability β. The intuition is that as β increases, it becomes costlier for the first lobbyist to choose a low level of investor protection, because the policymaker requires a greater compensation for deviating from the median voter choice. A greater political accountability induces the first lobby to allow a greater number of potential entrants in order to reduce the necessary contribution to gain legislative support, and the result is higher output. In this sense, democratic growth drives economic growth.
Prediction 1: The level of entry increases with greater political accountability.
Second, notice that δ * is increasing in φ and decreasing with the parameter of wealth inequality σ (while n * is unaffected by it). The intuition is that as σ increases, there will be more rich entrepreneurs who can setup their firm for a given level of investor protection. Since the optimal number of active entrepreneurs stays constant, investor protection must decrease.
Prediction 2: The level of investor protection increases with greater accountability and decreases with more wealth inequality.
These two predictions will be tested in the empirical session. The model has also a third prediction. Since δ * is decreasing in a and increasing in I and r, minority protection will increase in the profitability of production. A rise in the parameter a can be interpreted as a demand shock since a affects the marginal utility of apple pies. A rise in I and r could be seen as a supply shock that increases the cost of capital, thereby increasing the barrier to entry. As a increases, the optimal lobby size for the first lobbyist increases. The opposite mechanism operates with I and r. As the cost of capital increases, the first lobbyist prefers to represent fewer entrepreneurs.
Extensions
We now analyze some extensions of the basic model. First, in a democratic setting there is more than one policymaker, and a majority will determine legislation. We show that as in Groseclose and Snyder (1996) winning a legislative vote requires bribing a "supermajority" of legislators. The reason is that if the first lobby bribes only a marginal majority, the second lobby could concentrate its entire contribution on the only lobbied legislator and have him switch to its own proposal. The main result is the number of policymakers grow it becomes more expensive to lobby for low investor protection. Hence, the level of investor protection is increasing in the number of policymakers, which is a measure of dispersion of political power in the legislation and a good proxy for democracy.
The second extension explores the case in which rich consumers can fund entrepreneurs by becoming controlling shareholders. This allows us to consider the impact of private equity financing and groups. We show that in this setting the level of investor protection is lower than in the base case.
Third, we consider the case in which the politicians can choose a level of investor protection different from the proposals by the two lobbies. The results are unaffected by this extension.
Representative democracy
So far we have assumed that there is only one policymaker, or that policymakers are a compact group. This is more consistent with dictatorships than democracies. In this section, we remove this assumption. To do so, we follow the lobbying approach modelled in the seminal paper by Groseclose and Snyder (1996) and adapt it to our setup.
Policymakers are a fraction 2π of the population. To focus on the impact of the number of politicians we assume that the politicians' benevolence is fixed at β = 1/2. To simplify notation we assume that wealth inequality is fixed so that σ = I. The sequence of events is as in Section 4.1 except for two important changes. First, at stages 1 and 2, the lobbyists also choose how many policymakers to lobby. Second, at stage 4 the political decision is taken by majority rule. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that politicians vote for the second lobby when indifferent.
Stages 3 and 4 are exactly as in Section 4.1. At stage 2, the second lobbyist has the maximum amount of resources L 2 given in (12) to lobby politicians. The minimum cost of winning is given by the total transfer necessary to make a majority of politicians, π +ε (where ε is an arbitrarily small positive number), just slightly better off when voting for high investor protection rather than for low investor protection. In this approach, the second lobby can count on the favor of all politicians that did not receive any political contribution by the first lobby. More in general, in favor of the second lobby are all politicians that have been offered political contributions such that the difference in contribution between the two lobbies is smaller than the change in their utility due to the change in social surplus, ∆S. It is thus rational for the second lobby to start lobbying first politicians who have received the lowest contribution from the first lobby and to proceed then towards those with higher contribution, stopping when reaching a measure equal to π + ε of politicians.
This model allows us to restrict attention to contribution schedules that pay a fixed constant to all politicians who are lobbied and nothing to all others. Indeed, suppose one policymaker is offered less by the first lobby than the others. This politician will be an easier target for the opposing lobby. The first lobby is better off by reducing a little their contributions to other politicians to increase the contribution to this politician (Groveclose and Snyder, 1996) . This will either increase the probability of winning or reduce the total lobbying costs.
Hence, the first lobby chooses the political contribution L 1 and the fraction of politicians to lobby. Specifically, it is useful to denote this fraction as π(1 + ρ): in this notation, ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of politicians lobbied above the 50 percent level that is needed to win a majority vote. This is what is termed a super-majority.
In this setting the political equilibrium is the following:
Proposition 2: The number of active entrepreneurs is
where ξ * is an increasing function of the number of policymakers π. The level of investor protection chosen by the politician is:
Since ξ * is strictly increasing in the number of policymakers π, we can confirm Prediction 1: Investor protection increases with more democracy.
The intuition for this result is the following. The second lobby simply needs to win a simple majority of politicians, that is, π + ε politicians, with ε small and positive. To do so, it needs to bribe a measure πρ + ε of politicians. Since the surplus that the second lobby stands to gain is L 2 , the second lobbyist can pay each bribed politicians a maximum contribution of L 2 /(πρ + ε).
Thus in order to defeat the second lobby, the first lobby needs to offer a contribution equal to L 2 /(πρ + ε) + ∆S to a number π(1 + ρ) of politicians. The total cost of doing so is
The basic case analyzed in the previous section obtains if there is only one politician, that is, if 2π = 1, ρ = 1, and ε = 1/2. In general, as in Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , in equilibrium the lobbyist will lobby a supermajority of politicians, that is ρ * > 0. This happens because by lobbying more than half of the politicians, the first lobbyist increases the cost of lobbying for the second lobbyist.
As before, the first lobbyist then maximizes the surplus that he can generate, n 1 (m − n 1 ), net of the political contribution, L 1 . Proposition 2 states the results of that maximization and the corresponding level of investor protection.
Open agenda
So far, we have assumed that politicians are constrained to choose only between the levels of investor protection proposed by the two lobbyists. In this section we remove this assumption and allow the policymaker to choose any level of investor protection he likes. In this setting, the politician will compare the proposals of the two lobbies with the social optimum. To simplify notation we assume that wealth inequality is fixed so that σ = I.
It is easy to show that the analysis chances from Section 4 only if politicians prefer the social optimum to what the second lobby offers them in equilibrium. This happens only if (1 − β)L 2 < β(m − n 2 ) 2 /2. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, L 2 = (m − n 2 )(n 2 − n 1 ) where n 2 = (2m + n 1 )/3. Hence, the politicians prefer the social surplus only if β > 4/5. This result shows that the analysis is unchanged if β 6 4/5.
What happens if β > 4/5?
In that case the political contribution that the first lobbyist must pay is:
that is enough to compensate the policymaker to choose n 1 rather than m (the social optimum).
The first lobbyist then maximizes the surplus that he can generate:
From the first order condition (necessary and sufficient because the objective function is concave in n 1 ), we find that n 1 = m/(2 − β). Since n maps into a level of investor protection δ = nI(1 + r)/[m(a − n)], we find the level of investor protection
As before entry and investor protection are increasing in the index of accountability β. A similar result holds for wealth inequality.
Empirical Evidence
In this section we test the predictions of the model, performing two types of analysis. First, we test whether proxies for wealth inequality and democracy are respectively negatively and positively correlated with effective enforcement in cross country regressions, and whether they remain significant after controlling for the standard explanatory variables suggested by the legal origin literature. Second, we test whether there is indeed more entry in sector that need more external capital in countries with more democratic accountability, and whether this result is robust to various measure of financial development. Both sets of results are born by the data. 17 Enforcement is measured as the average of the five measures of enforcement proposed by LLSV (1998): efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of contractual repudiation. As a proxy for political accountability we use the average democracy score for the period 1976-95 from Polity IV. This index measures the general openness of political institutions and ranges between zero and ten, with a greater number indicating greater democracy. As a proxy for wealth inequality we use the Gini coefficient of income inequality for 1994 or the closest available year as produced by the World Bank World Development Indicators. The index takes values between zero and 100, with a higher number indicating greater inequality.
Enforcement
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In Table 2 , we show a direct test of the second prediction of the model by finding the partial correlations between enforcement and income inequality and democracy score. As predicted by the model, democracy score is positively correlated and income inequality is negatively correlated with enforcement. This result is robust to alternative determinants of enforcement. First, in column 2, we add the dummy common law as a regressor and show that this does not change the significance of the coefficients of democracy and income inequality. Second, in column 3, we add the per capita income, which captures the impact of economic development. Still, the coefficients of democracy and income inequality are unchanged. Per capita income is however an important determinant of enforcement. Overall, the results in Table 2 are highly consistent with Prediction 2 of the model.
The results are also economically significant. According to column 3, an increase in democracy from zero to 5.6 (from the level in Indonesia to Philippines') is associated with about one-half-point increase in enforcement (out of ten). A decrease in wealth inequality by 10 points (from Brazil's to Turkey's) is associated with a one-quarter-point increase in enforcement.
Entry
In this section we address Prediction 1 of our model. For this purpose, we adopt the methodology developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) [henceforth RZ] . We use the data from UNIDO to build a measure of entry across industries and countries. We then classify industries using the measure of external dependence developed by RZ and run regressions in which we can control for fixed-effects at country and industry level. We use this framework to study the impact of political accountability on entry.
As a measure of entry we use the average growth rate in the number of establishment in the 1983-92 interval.
19 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for this variable and all other variables used in this session. We have a total of 1146 observations from 38 countries and 33 industries. As a control variable, we also compute for each country-industry the industry's share of total number of establishments. From RZ, we borrow the measure of external dependence of each industry. This variable is computed as the average external dependence of young US firms operating in each industry.
In the first set of regressions, reported in Table 4 , external dependence at the industry level is interacted with three variables at the country level: democracy score and income inequality, which are evaluated over a 20-year period leading up to 1983; and stock market development is the stock market capitalization divided by the GDP in 1980, as reported by RZ.
In the second set of regressions, reported in Table 5 , external dependence is interacted with other control variables: common law, which is a dummy variable that identifies countries with English legal origin, banking sector development, which is the domestic credit to the private sector divided by GDP in 1980, accounting standards, which is the 1983 index of the quality of accounting disclosure by companies developed by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research, and per capita income, which is the GNP per capita in 1980. As shown in Table 3 , this second set of variables is collected only for a subset of 25 countries. The reason is that accounting standards is only available for those 25 countries.
The results in column 1 of Table 4 show that there is more entry in industries that need more external capital in countries that are relatively more democratic. This result is consistent with Prediction 1 of the model that entry increases with political accountability. As shown in column 2, income inequality is not statistically significant when interacted with external dependence. Stock market development is instead statistically significant in column 3: there is more entry in industries that need more external capital in countries with a relatively more developed stock market. In column 4, we include both democracy and stock market development and show that they are both significant and positively correlated with growth, suggesting that they identify two different channels that affects growth.
In Table 5 , we perform further robustness checks that indeed democracy is good for growth. First, we consider the impact of legal origin. In column 1, we find that English legal origin facilitates entry in sector that need more external capital. In column 2, we find that the development of the banking sector is not conducive to greater entry. In column 3, we show that better accounting standards is associated with greater entry. In column 4 we do not find that economic development, as measured by per capita income, has any effect on entry. Across all these regression, the impact of democracy score on entry remains unaffected. In column 5, we run a horse race among all variables that were statistically significant in individual regressions. We find that democracy score and English legal origin are the only significant variables and are both positively correlated with growth. In fact, once we account for democratic accountability, financial development appears to have no additional explanatory power.
The results in this session strongly support the prediction in the model that political accountability, and more generally the set of constraints on the executive power, is a major determinant for growth, as it reduces the influence of lobbying on political decisions.
Conclusion
In this paper we present a model in which established interests lobby politicians to maintain a low level of enforcement, and specifically investor protection, in order to prevent potential entry. We derive endogenously the size of the winning lobby and the level of investor protection (and thus financial development) emerging from the political decision. We show that the rich lobby always wins, limiting financial development and entry, unless society becomes significantly accountable. Investor protection increases when the country becomes more democratic, or when wealth distribution becomes less unequal, or when financial integration or open trade improve access to capital.
A main feature of a political economy approach to institutional design is that most variables become endogenous. In our approach, we take the initial income distribution as exogenous. In practice, lobbying contributes to determining future wealth and income distribution.
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In our model there is a direct link between weak institutions restricting the opportunistic use of legislation, our measure of democratic accountability, and economic growth. We have shown that lobbying by established interests is likely to actively discourage growth, and that its impact increases with greater inequality. We illustrated how undermining financial development is a natural channel for blocking entry. Our empirical results suggest however that inequality has a greater explanatory power on entry than financial development itself, suggesting it is a major determinant. Just as relevant for entry and financial development is the degree of political accountability, a concept hard to measure empirically. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) distinguish between weak enforcement of private contracts and weak constraints on the state, and argue that the former reduce the degree of financial development, while the latter has a direct impact on growth. Lobbying can produce many types of entry barriers, such as via regulatory requirements, corruption, or a selective enforcement of laws protecting contracting or property rights. Even efforts at financial development may be captured by an opportunistic elite. Privatization and liberalization of the banking system may fail to deliver growth if it is undermined by connected lending and outright plundering by bank owners, as in Mexico before 1994 (de-Silanes, 2002 Hauser et al. 2003) and in Russia (Perotti, 2001 ). In conclusion, while good legislation and policy play a role, ultimately development of capital markets, entry and growth require an effective and fair enforcement of rules. As in deSoto (1998), poor legal enforcement and unclear property rights limits individuals' ability to reliably commit contractually, and affect average growth because it reduces the median citizen's freedom of economic initiative, at the benefit of established interests and at the cost of societal welfare, as argued forcefully in Rajan and Zingales (2003) .
Proof of Proposition 1. At stage 4 the politician compares the values of n requested by the two lobbies: n 1 and n 2 . The difference in social surplus between n 2 and n 1 is
Hence, the politicians will vote in favor of the first lobby as long as
where L 1 and L 2 are the contributions of the first and second lobbies, respectively. They vote in favor of the second lobby, otherwise.
At stage 3, assuming without loss of generality that n 2 > n 1 , entrepreneurs join the first lobby if their wealth is sufficiently high: that is, if w j > I(m − n 1 )/m. For these entrepreneurs the success of the first lobby guarantees them higher profits. Those potential entrepreneurs with intermediate level of wealth join the second lobby: if I(m − n 1 )/m > w j > I(m − n 2 )/m. All the remaining potential entrepreneurs do not join any lobby, since they will never be able to enter in either case.
At stage 2, the second lobbyist chooses n 2 to make it as costly as possible for the first lobby to win, that is he chooses n 2 to maximize L 2 + β∆S/(1 − β), where L 2 = (n 2 − n 1 )(m − n 2 ) is the surplus enjoyed by the second lobby. Substituting ∆S using expression (A1), we have that the second lobbyist maximizes
From the first order condition (necessary and sufficient since the objective function is concave in n 2 ), we find that
At stage 1, the first lobbyist anticipates that he will win by paying a political contribution that satisfies the inequality (A2). Substituting the expression for n 2 given in (A4) in expression (A3), we obtain the expression for the the political contribution that the first lobby needs to pay in order to win:
From the first order condition (necessary and sufficient because the objective function is concave in n 1 ), we find that n 1 = mφ ≡ n * , where φ ≡
Thus the size of the winning lobby is smaller than m. By substituting n * into the objective function (A6), it is easy to see that the objective function is strictly positive. Hence, the first lobbyist will indeed choose n 1 = n * , the first lobby will win, and the number of active entrepreneurs in the economy will be n * . Thus there are fewer active entrepreneurs than what would be optimal.
Since n maps into a level of investor protection δ = nσ+m(I−σ)/2 m(a−n)
(1 + r), we find the level of investor protection by replacing n = n * in this expression. ¥ Proof of Proposition 2. To win, the second lobby needs to bribe a measure πρ + ε of politicians, and can pay each of them a maximum contribution of L 2 /(πρ + ε). Thus to defeat the second lobby, the first lobby needs to offer a contribution equal to L 2 /(πρ + ε) + ∆S to a number π(1 + ρ) of politicians. To maximize the chances of winning, the second lobby maximizes the costs for the first lobby to win:
where we let ε go to 0 since ε can be arbitrarily small.
By substituting (A8) into the objective function (A7), we find that the cost of winning for the first lobby is
where
The first lobbyist chooses ρ = ρ * to minimize L 1 . Notice that ρ * is independent of the size of the initial lobby n 1 (this is because expression A9 is separable in ρ and n 1 ). Without solving for ρ * one can use the envelope theorem to show that the minimum lobbying cost ξ * is an increasing function of the number of politicians π.
The minimum lobbying cost is therefore
From the first order condition (necessary and sufficient because the objective function is concave in n 1 ), we find that n 1 = m(1 + 2ξ * )/(2 + 2ξ * ) ≡ n * * . Notice that ξ * depends only on and is increasing in the number of politicians π. Notice also that (1 + 2ξ * )/(2 + 2ξ * ) < 1 and that n * * is increasing in ξ * .
As before, n maps uniquely into a level of investor protection δ given by δ *
Proof of Proposition 3. At stage 2, the second lobbyist choose n 2 to maximize the costs for the first lobby to win:
where L 2 = (n 2 −n 1 )(m−n 2 −mk) and ∆S = (n 2 −n 1 )[m(1−k)−(n 1 +n 2 )/2]. From the first order condition (necessary and sufficient because the objective function is concave in n 2 ) n 2 = [2m
The first lobbyist must then pay a political contribution equal to:
From the first order condition (necessary and sufficient because the objective function is concave in n 1 ), we find that n 1 = m(7 − 7k)/10. The number of active entrepreneurs is n = n 1 + mk = m(7 + 3k)/10 < m. Since n maps into a level of investor protection δ = (n − mk)I(1 + r)/[m(a − n)], we find the level of investor protection by replacing n = n * * * in this expression. ¥ Table 1 . ***, **, * indicate significance at 1% percent, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The standard errors shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White correction.
(1) (2) Entry is the average annual growth rate in the number of establishment operating in a sector in the 1983-92 interval, as reported by UNIDO. Industry's share of total number of establishments is the number of establishment in a given manufacturing sector as a fraction of the total number of establishment in the country at the beginning of the interval, from UNIDO. External dependence is a measure of the dependence on external capital for young firms as measured by Rajan and Zingales (1998) The dependent variable is entry in the period 1983-92. Independent variables are the industry's share of total number of establishment in the country at the beginning of the interval, and several interaction terms obtained by multiplying external dependence for young firms with three country-level variables: (1) democracy score; (2) income inequality; and (3) stock market development. All variables are defined in Table 3 . All regressions contain fixed effects for countries and industries (not reported). *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. The standard errors shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White correction.
(1) Table 5 . Robustness Check
The dependent variable is entry in the 1983-92 interval. Independent variables are the industry's share of total number of establishment in the country at the beginning of the interval, and several interaction terms obtained by multiplying external dependence, which measures the industry dependence on external capital for young firms, with six countrylevel variables: (1) democracy score; (2) common law; (3) banking sector development; (4) accounting standards; (5) per capita income; and (6) stock market development. All variables are defined in Table 3 . All regressions contain fixed effects for countries and industries (not reported). *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. The standard errors shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using HuberWhite correction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) • Entrepreneurs raise capital on the equity market.
• An amount of apples (capital) I is needed to set up a firm.
• Apple pies (output) are produced.
• Entrepreneurs can expropriate shareholders by keeping up to a fraction 1-δ of the output.
• The market of apples opens: price p is determined.
• Dividends are paid out.
• Agents choose their consumption bundle and consume. 
